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Beyond the Cheese: Discerning What
“Causes Dilution” Under 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c)—A Recommendation to Whittle
Away the Liberal Application of
Trademark Dilution to Internet Domain
Names
Matthew D. Caudill*
What do you call a phenomenon that cannot be seen,
measured, or otherwise perceived or detected and that,
for sixty-five years, has proven wholly resistant to
analysis? In intellectual property law, it is known as
dilution.
—Jonathan E. Moskin1
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INTRODUCTION
Trademark2 law emerged as a means to protect against
consumer confusion and reward investments in product quality.3

2

A trademark
includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof—(1)
used by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in
commerce and applies to register on the principal register established by this
[Act], to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product,
from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the
goods, even if that source is unknown.
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). The Lanham Act is the federal trademark statute. Act of July 5,
1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127
(2000)). The Commerce Clause affords Congress the ability to regulate trademarks and
acts of unfair competition affecting interstate commerce. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
For the purposes of this Article, the terms “trademark” and “mark” as used herein shall
refer to both trademarks and service marks (as well as collective and certification marks)
without distinction. A service mark is
any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof–(1) used by a
person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and
applies to register on the principal register established by this [Act], to identify
and distinguish the services of one person, including a unique service, from the
services of others and to indicate the source of the services, even if that source
is unknown. Titles, character names, and other distinctive features of radio or
television programs may be registered as service marks notwithstanding that
they, or the programs, may advertise the goods of the sponsor.
15 U.S.C. § 1127.
3
See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108
YALE L.J. 1687, 1688 (1999).
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The protection afforded the users of distinctive marks4 evolved
from the markings affixed to goods so as to indicate origin or
ownership.5 Whereas utility promoted quality and prevented
piracy 400 years ago, the purposes of modern trademark protection
may not be the same as its roots.6
4

A mark is distinctive if
the designation is “inherently distinctive,” in that, because of the nature of the
designation and the context in which it is used, prospective purchasers are
likely to perceive it as a designation that, in the case of a trademark, identifies
goods or services produced or sponsored by a particular person, whether known
or anonymous, or in the case of a trade name, identifies the business or other
enterprise of a particular person, whether known or anonymous, or in the case
of a collective mark, identifies members of the collective group or goods or
services produced or sponsored by members, or in the case of certification
mark, identifies the certified goods or services; or
the designation, although not “inherently distinctive,” has become distinctive,
in that, as a result of its use, prospective purchasers have come to perceive it as
a designation that identifies goods, services, businesses, or members in the
manner described in Subsection (a). Such acquired distinctiveness is
commonly referred to as “secondary meaning.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 (1995) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
A mark is generally protected in a manner proportional to its distinctiveness. See
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976) (“Arrayed
in an ascending order which roughly reflects their eligibility to trademark status and the
degree of protection accorded, these classes are (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3)
suggestive, and (4) arbitrary or fanciful.”). Generic marks, such as “car” for an
automobile, are ineligible for protection because such words merely name the object or
class to which the mark applies. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 215 (2d
Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Nabisco II]. Descriptive marks merely describe the attributes of a
product. For instance, the mark “sticky” for glue would be descriptive of the texture of
the product. See id. Descriptive marks must acquire secondary meaning to be eligible for
trademark protection. Id. A mark acquires secondary meaning when the consuming
public associates such mark with the products of its user rather than, or in addition to, its
customary meaning. Id. Suggestive marks merely suggest the qualities of the product and
are thus protectable without a showing of secondary meaning. Id. For example,
“Tanaway” for suntan oil is suggestive of the effect of the product. Arbitrary or fanciful
marks enjoy the highest level of protection. See id. at 216. Such marks bear no logical
relationship between the mark and its product. See id. “Kodak” for camera equipment
and “Aunt Jemima” for pancake syrup are examples of arbitrary or fanciful marks. See id.
5
See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L.
REV. 813, 814 (1927). Merchants also placed proprietary marks on their goods to prevent
piracy or in case of shipwreck so that the goods could be identified and reclaimed by the
owner. Id.
6
Id. Professor Schechter commented:
To what extent does the trademark of today really function as either [indicating
origin or ownership of the goods to which it is affixed]? Actually, not in the
least! It has been repeatedly pointed out by the very courts that insist on
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Modern trademarks promote product quality and thereby
stimulate product sales.7 While a trademark may manifest the
goodwill of a product, it also may create and enhance such
goodwill.8 A manufacturer who affixes her mark to her product is
able to directly sway the consumer, reaching “over the shoulder of
the retailer.”9 With this powerful tool, trademark owners have
sought increased protection for their investment in product quality
and advertising as reflected in the strength of their trademarks.10
But not all marks are created equal. The protection afforded
trademarks necessarily depends upon the strength of the marks.
The stronger the association between a trademark and a product,
the more protection the law affords the owner of the mark.11
Coined or fanciful marks such as Kodak12 or Aunt Jemima
immediately bring to mind camera equipment or pancake syrup to
the consuming public. On the opposite end of the spectrum,
generic marks such as Bob’s Tuna may not evoke any particular
product or product quality. Trademark law serves to protect the
investments in strong marks to prevent against consumer
confusion.
The traditional means of enforcing one’s trademark was the
infringement cause of action. Trademark infringement occurs
when “a person uses a trademark in a way that creates a ‘likelihood
of confusion’ as to the affiliation, connection, or association of the

defining trademarks in terms of ownership or origin that, owing to the
ramifications of modern trade and the national and international distribution of
goods from the manufacturer through the jobber or importer and the retailer to
the consumer, the source or origin of the goods bearing a well known
trademark is seldom known to the consumer.
Id. (citations omitted).
7
See David J. Franklyn, The Apparent Manufacturer Doctrine, Trademark Licensors
and the Third Restatement of Torts, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 678 (1999).
8
Schechter, supra note 5, at 818–19 (“The mark actually sells the goods. And, selfevidently, the more distinctive the mark, the more effective is its selling power.”).
9
Id. at 818.
10
See id. at 821.
11
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
12
One thing is for sure; a junior user should never even attempt to challenge the Kodak
mark. Kodak is a favorite of courts and commentators upon which to expound. See, e.g.,
Lemley, infra note 15.
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junior user with the senior user.”13 Trademark infringement serves
to protect the public from confusion over marks that may tend to
indicate that two competing goods derived from the same
manufacturer.14 The application of this doctrine may seem
apparent; one cannot legally apply the Kodak mark to camera
products unless it actually originates (or receives consent) from the
Eastman Kodak Company.
While Kodak brings to mind camera equipment, it does not
project an association with auto parts. Certain strong trademarks
have acquired a life of their own. Trademark law, in turn, has as
well. The law of dilution protects strong trademarks against
similar uses of the mark on non-competitive products.15
Proponents of trademark dilution believe that the presence of
similar marks on other goods will eventually weaken the consumer
association with the strong mark and its product and thus blur or
even tarnish the strong mark.16 The growth of the dilution doctrine
in the last sixty-five years culminated with the passage of the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA).17
Subsequent to the passage of the FTDA, courts have
inconsistently interpreted the causation element of the new cause
of action. In Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc.,18 the Second Circuit
held that a mere showing of a likelihood of dilution will suffice to
grant a senior user injunctive relief, preventing a junior user from

13

Courtland L. Reichman, State and Federal Trademark Dilution, 17 FRANCHISE L.J.
111, 111 (1999). To prevail on a trademark infringement claim, a plaintiff must show:
(1) a protectable mark and (2) likelihood of confusion as to the origin, affiliation or
sponsorship of the defendant’s product.
14
See id.
15
Lemley, supra note 3, at 1698 (illustrating the ideal situation wherein “[d]ilution
laws . . . [protect] against the possibility that the unique nature of a mark will be
destroyed by companies who trade on the renown of the mark by selling unrelated goods,
such as Kodak pianos or Buick aspirin”).
16
Thus, in a sense, while trademark infringement protects the public from confusion
and, secondarily, the owner of the mark, trademark dilution protects the mark itself.
William Marroletti, Dilution, Confusion, or Delusion? The Need for a Clear
International Standard to Determine Trademark Dilution, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 659, 662
(1999) (“Because dilution theory protects against harm to the mark itself, rather than its
ability to signify goods or services, it is more akin to a property-based protection.”).
17
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).
18
191 F.3d 208, 223–24 (2d Cir. 1999).
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using a similar mark on a non-competitive product.19 Conversely,
in Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah
Division of Travel Development,20 the Fourth Circuit held that a
plaintiff must show that a sufficiently similar junior mark must
actually lessen the ability of the senior mark to distinguish its
goods.21 On April 14, 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider the quandary presented by this circuit split.22
The interpretation of the FTDA in Nabisco is particularly
troubling, in that it effectively empowers the owner of a strong
mark to curtail the use of any similar mark in areas wherein the
owner does not even have a market for her goods. Rather than
simply critique it as applied, however, this Article will analyze the
effects of applying the Second Circuit’s holding in Nabisco to
Internet23 domain names.24
19

Id. Interestingly, the Second Circuit also applied the FTDA to competing products.

Id.
20

170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 458–59.
22
V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 122
S. Ct. 1536 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2002) (No. 01-1015) (adopting the “likelihood of dilution”
analysis of the Second Circuit in Nabisco II). See infra Part II.B–C.
23
“Internet” refers to the worldwide information system that—
21

(i) is logically linked together by a globally unique address space
based on the Internet Protocol (IP) or its subsequent
extensions/follow-ons;
(ii) is able to support communications using the Transmission Control
Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) suite or its subsequent
extensions/follow-ons, and/or other IP-compatible protocols; and
(iii) provides, uses or makes accessible, either publicly or privately,
high level services layered on the communications and related
infrastructure described herein.
John V. Erskine, Don’t Believe the Hyperlink—Potential Liability of Issuers Under AntiFraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws for Embedding Hyperlinks to Analysts’
Reports on Their Web Sites, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 190, 190 n.1 (2001) (citing Federal
Networking Council (FNC) Resolution: Definition of “Internet,” at http://www.itrd.gov/
fnc/Internet_res.html (last modified Oct. 30, 1995)).
24
The domain name system [DNS]
uses a hierarchical naming scheme known as domain names, which is similar to
the Unix filesystem tree. The root of the DNS tree is a special node with a null
label. The name of each node (except root) has to be up to 63 characters. The
domain name of any node in the tree is the list of labels, starting at that node,
working up to the root, using a period (‘dot’) to separate the labels (individual
sections of a name might represent sites or a group, but the domain system
simply calls each section a label). The difference between the Unix filesystem
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This Article contends that the liberal application of trademark
dilution to trademarks associated with Internet domain names
frustrates the original purposes of trademark protection. The
limited availability of means to distinguish domain names,
compared to the traditional uses of trademarks as pictures, words,
and other two- or three-dimensional properties affixed to products
(i.e., logos), allows the owners of strong trademarks to exclude a
multitude of domain names. Rather than protecting the origin or
ownership of a product, such application tends to produce a
property right in gross, something trademark law should not do.
Part I traces the evolution of the modern dilution doctrine, from
the common law to the enactment of the FTDA. Part II outlines
the development of the doctrine after the FTDA, including the split
between the federal circuits. Part III introduces particular
difficulties that the Internet Domain Name System (DNS)
introduces and explores ways Congress and the courts have
attempted to handle these difficulties. This Article concludes by
calling for a reexamination of the protection afforded to strong
trademarks in the context of Internet domain names. The rapid
expansion of trademark dilution should halt. Appropriate action by
the U.S. Supreme Court in adopting the dilution causation standard
of the Fourth Circuit25 or by Congress in repealing the FTDA as

and the tree of the DNS is that in the DNS we start on the ground and ‘go up’
till the root. Writing them in this order makes it possible to compress messages
that contain multiple domain names. Thus, the domain name ‘tau.ac.il’
contains three labels: ‘tau’, ‘ac’, and ‘il’. Any suffix of a label in a domain
name is also called a domain. In the above example the lowest level domain is
‘tau.ac.il’ (the domain name for the Tel-Aviv University Academic
organization in Israel), the second level domain is ‘ac.il’ (the domain name for
Academic organizations of Israel), and the top level domain [hereinafter TLD]
(for this name) is ‘il’ (the domain name for Israel). The node il is the second
level node (after root).
DNS: The Domain Name System, at http://www.rad.com/networks/1995/dns/dns.htm (last
visited Nov. 20, 2002). There are many top level domains [TLDs] available, including:
.arpa, .com, .edu, .mil, .il and .us. Id. Newer TLDs include: .aero, .biz, .coop, .info,
.museum, .name, and .pro. Seven New TLD Proposals Selected for Introduction, at
http://www.icann.org/tlds/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2002).
25
The position advocated by the Solicitor General would also serve these policy
considerations and effectively resolve the circuit split. See infra notes 175–177 and
accompanying text.
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applied to Internet domain names would reinvigorate competition
over the Internet.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN DILUTION DOCTRINE
The premise underlying trademark dilution is the inadequacy of
trademark infringement protection. Trademark dilution “grants
protection to strong, well-recognized marks even in the absence of
a likelihood of confusion.”26 Ostensibly, a junior user can damage
the senior user’s mark without even a likelihood of consumers
confusing the two marks. Such use may act to “diminish or dilute
the strong identification value of the plaintiff’s mark even while
not confusing customers as to source, sponsorship, affiliation or
connection.”27
The protection afforded thereby to a senior user derives not
from a concern for the consuming public but for the property right
of the senior user in his mark. While trademark infringement
protects the consuming public from a likelihood of confusion,
trademark dilution protects against the “gradual attenuation or
whittling away of the value of a trademark.”28 The essence of
dilution, Professor McCarthy discerned, “constitutes an invasion of
the senior user’s property right in [her] mark and gives rise to an
independent commercial tort.”29
A. State and Common Law
Prior to the enactment of the FTDA, state law was the
exclusive source of the dilution cause of action. Presently, most
states provide relief either through statute30 or common law.31
26

4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
24:70, at 24-122 (4th ed. 2002).
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id. (emphasis added).
30
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-12-17 (1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-71-214 (Michie 2001);
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 14330 (West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 3313 (1993);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 495.151 (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-451 (1994); IDAHO
CODE § 48-113 (Michie 1997); IOWA CODE § 548.113 (1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
51:223.1 (West 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1530 (West 1997); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 110B, § 12 (Law. Co-op. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 333.285 (West 2001);
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Most state dilution statutes follow the Model State Trademark Act,
which provides:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of
the distinctive quality of a mark registered under this Act,
or at a mark valid at common law, or a trade name valid at
common law, shall be a ground for injunctive relief
notwithstanding the absence of competition between the
parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of
goods or services.32
Injunctive relief is typically the only remedy accompanying a
finding of dilution.33 State dilution claims typically provide
dilution relief in two instances: blurring and tarnishment.
1. Blurring
Dilution by blurring constitutes the traditional notion of
dilution.
Blurring occurs as “[c]ustomers or prospective
customers . . . see the plaintiff’s mark used by other persons to
identify other sources on a plethora of different goods and
services.”34 While no confusion exists as to the “source,
sponsorship, affiliation or connection,” the value of the plaintiff’s
mark decreases.35 The mark loses its “unique and distinctive
significance . . . to identify and distinguish one source . . . .”36 The
focus is upon damage to the inherent value of the mark as a symbol
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-25-25 (1996); MO. ANN. STAT. § 417.061(1) (West 1990); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 30-13-334 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350-A:12 (1995); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 56:3-13.20 (West 1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-3B-15 (Michie 2001); N.Y. GEN.
BUS. LAW § 360-L (McKinney 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 647.107 (1993); 54 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1124 (West 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-2-12 (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 3915-1165 (Law. Co-op. 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-512 (1995); TEX. BUS. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 16.29 (Vernon 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.77.160 (West 1997).
31
See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026 (2d
Cir. 1989) (applying New York law); Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788
(9th Cir. 1981) (applying California law).
32
MODEL STATE TRADEMARK ACT § 12 (1964) [hereinafter MODEL ACT], reprinted in 3
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 22:8
(4th ed. 2002); see Reichman, note 13, at 132.
33
Reichman, supra note 13, at 132.
34
4 MCCARTHY, supra note 26, § 24.68, at 24-120.
35
Id.
36
Id.
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rather than upon whether the public has been misled with regard to
origin or ownership.37
In Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Productions, Inc.,38 the
Second Circuit considered whether the use of the character name
“Spa’am” in a movie blurred the “Spam” mark for luncheon
meat.39 The court began by citing examples of dilution by
blurring: “DuPont shoes, Buick aspirin tablets, Schlitz varnish,
Kodak pianos, Bulova gowns, and so forth.”40 The court compared
the use of the two marks and concluded that there was no
likelihood the Henson parody would weaken the public association
between Spam and lunch meat.41 Instead, the court posited that the
parody would “prevent the type of blurring which might result
from a more subtle or insidious effort at humor at plaintiff’s
expense.”42
2. Tarnishment
Dilution by tarnishment constitutes appreciable damage to the
plaintiff’s mark by another’s unflattering or offensive use. The
effect of the “unauthorized use is to tarnish, degrade, or dilute the
distinctive quality of the mark.”43 Typical instances of tarnishment
include “an attempted parody context that is totally dissonant with
the image protected by the mark.”44 The effects of dilution by
37

See Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 793 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding
“Sears’ use of ‘Bagzilla’ has not impaired the effectiveness of the name and image of
Godzilla”).
38
73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 1996).
39
Id. at 500 (applying New York’s anti-dilution statute).
40
Id. at 506 (quoting the legislative history of New York’s trademark law, 1954 N.Y.
LEGIS. ANN. 49–50).
41
Id.
42
Id. The court continued:
This conclusion is strengthened when we consider that Henson’s parody
undermines any superficial similarities the marks might share. As we noted
above, the name “Spa’am” will always appear next to the character likeness
and the words “Muppet Treasure Island.” This dissimilarity alone could defeat
Hormel’s blurring claim, for in order to establish dilution by blurring, the two
marks must not only be similar, they “must be ‘very’ or substantially similar.”
Id. (quoting Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026,
1029 (2d Cir. 1989)).
43
4 MCCARTHY, supra note 26, at § 24:69, at 24-121.
44
Id.
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tarnishment are more readily apparent than the effects of dilution
by blurring.
In Hormel, the Second Circuit also considered whether the use
of the character name “Spa’am” tarnished the “Spam” mark.45 The
court began this analysis by observing that tarnishment occurs
when “the public . . . associate[s] the lack of quality or lack of
prestige in the defendant’s goods with the plaintiff’s unrelated
goods.”46 The court reviewed precedent wherein successful
tarnishment claims typically involved a tarnished mark placed in
context of obscenity, sexual activity, or illegal activity.47 Hormel
contended that the Spa’am character, “a ‘grotesque,’ ‘untidy’ wild
boar,” inspired unwelcome associations with Spam lunch meat.48
The court again focused upon the humorous use of the Spa’am
character, finding no corresponding negative association with
Hormel’s mark.49
B. The FTDA
In 1995, Congress passed the FTDA.50 Partly due to the
“patch-quilt system” of trademark protection available through

45

73 F.3d at 507.
Id. (citing Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994)).
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a), 109 Stat. 985,
985–86 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000)):
(c) Remedies for dilution of famous marks
(1) The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles
of equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an
injunction against another person’s commercial use in commerce of a
mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous
and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain
such other relief as is provided in this subsection. In determining whether
a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may consider factors such as, but
not limited to—
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the
goods or services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is
used;
46
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state law, given that only about half of the fifty states provided a
dilution cause of action,51 Congress sought to provide a federal
cause of action to discourage forum shopping.52 The FTDA

(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the
mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and
channels of trade used by the marks’ owner and the person against
whom the injunction is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third
parties; and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881,
or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
(2) In an action brought under this subsection, the owner of the famous
mark shall be entitled only to injunctive relief as set forth in section 1116
of this title unless the person against whom the injunction is sought
willfully intended to trade on the owner’s reputation or to cause dilution of
the famous mark. If such willful intent is proven, the owner of the famous
mark shall also be entitled to the remedies set forth in sections 1117(a) and
1118 of this title, subject to the discretion of the court and the principles of
equity.
(3) The ownership by a person of a valid registration under the Act of
March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal
register shall be a complete bar to an action against that person, with
respect to that mark, that is brought by another person under the common
law or a statute of a State and that seeks to prevent dilution of the
distinctiveness of a mark, label, or form of advertisement.
(4) The following shall not be actionable under this section:
(A) Fair use of a famous mark by another person in comparative
commercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods
or services of the owner of the famous mark.
(B) Noncommercial use of a mark.
(C) All forms of news reporting and news commentary.
15 U.S.C. § 1125.
51
See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows Corp.,
937 F. Supp. 204, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
52
Id. at 208; see also Kimbley L. Muller, Dilution Law: At A Crossroad? A Position of
Advocacy in Support of Adoption of a Preemptive Federal Antidilution Statute, 83
TRADEMARK REP. 175, 181, 188, 191–92 (noting that state courts inconsistently interpret
clear statutory language, states with greater populations and thereby more litigation
control an important aspect of interstate commerce, and the injunctive relief afforded
under state law is inadequate due to the geographic limitations). Cf. Richard L.
Kirkpatrick & Sheldon H. Klein, A Commentary on the New Federal Trademark Dilution
Law, in PROVING LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION IN TRADEMARK LAW: A COMMENTARY ON
THE NEW FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION LAW, at 60 (PLI Pats., Copyrights,
Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. G4-3973, 1996) (“As a
practical matter, the trademark lawyer who likes to leave nothing unpleaded will now
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contributed several new concepts to the realm of trademark
dilution law. First, the FTDA defines dilution as “the lessening of
the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or
services, regardless of the presence or absence of—(1) competition
between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2)
likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.”53 Second, the
allegedly diluted mark must be famous and distinctive,54 among
other factors.55 Additionally, unlike state dilution statutes which
protect against a likelihood of dilution,56 the FTDA protects
against a junior mark that “causes dilution of the distinctive quality
of the [senior] mark.”57
1. Fame
For a mark to qualify for protection it must be famous.58 The
FTDA does not define the term “famous” nor does it provide
quantitative measures for determining fame.59 Rather, it sets forth
eight factors,60 applicable in deciding both distinctiveness and
fame.61 Courts and commentators have struggled in applying these

simply tack a federal dilution claim onto the principal claims of infringement and false
designation of origin, instead of (or in addition to) a state dilution claim.”).
53
15 U.S.C. § 1127.
54
Id. § 1125(c)(1).
55
The allegedly dilutive mark must not be on the principal register nor be validly
registered. Id. § 1125(c)(3). In addition, the alleged dilutive party’s use began after the
allegedly diluted mark became famous. Id. § 1125(c)(1). The junior use of the allegedly
dilutive mark is not considered a fair use, news reporting or news commentary. Id. §
1125(c)(4)(A). See generally Gregg Duffey, Trademark Dilution Under the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: You’ve Come a Long Way Baby—Too Far, Maybe?, 39
S. TEX. L. REV. 133 (1997).
In addition, the dilutive use must be one that is a commercial use in commerce. See
Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 1276,
1278 (C.D. Cal. 1997). For the purposes of this Article, it shall be assumed that such
provisions outlined in this note are not at issue. The mere registration of a domain name
without more is not commercial use. Id.; but see infra Part IV.A.
56
MODEL ACT, supra note 32 and accompanying text.
57
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (emphasis added).
58
Id.
59
Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, The New Wild West: Measuring and Proving Fame and
Dilution Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 63 ALB. L. REV. 201, 209–13
(1999).
60
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(A)–(H).
61
Nguyen, supra note 59, at 212.
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factors and distinguishing fame from distinctiveness.62 While
courts tend to consider fame63 and distinctiveness as separate
elements, the analyses seem to be quite similar.
In WAWA Dairy Farms v. Haaf, the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania considered whether the mark
“Wawa” used for convenience stores was a famous mark.64 The
court considered that the mark had been used extensively for
nearly ninety years in the convenience store market.65 The mark,
the court continued, achieved notoriety in the operation of the
twenty-four hour convenience market by providing quality
products, convenient locations and extensive advertising.66 The
court concluded the “Wawa” mark therefore was famous under the
FTDA.67
In Michael Caruso & Co. v. Estefan Enterprises, Inc.,68 the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida considered
whether the “Bongo” mark used on jeans was famous.69 The court
stated that a mark may be distinctive in a particular market, but to
be considered famous it must effectuate the general recognition of
62

See Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 875–79 (9th Cir. 1999)
(maintaining a stringent review of the eight non-exclusive statutory considerations for
fame); Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 2000 WL 1428665, at *11–*12
(S.D. Ind. Aug. 30, 2000) (recognizing current dispute among courts as to whether fame
is a separate inquiry from whether a mark is distinctive, holding secondary meaning will
suffice in either respect); Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, What Constitutes “Famous
Mark” for Purposes of Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c), Which
Provides Remedies for Dilution of Famous Marks, 165 A.L.R. FED. 625 (2000)
(cataloguing discussion of fame requirements for marks based upon recent decisions).
63
Notable findings of fame include: “Papal Visit 1999” for the papal visit to St. Louis;
“Dennison” as part of a corporate name; “Nailtiques” as used in fingernail care products;
“TeleTech” for customer care information services; “Gazette” for use in a local Maryland
paper; “Intermatic” for electrical products; and “Wedgwood” for house builders in
Oregon. Lemley, supra note 3, at 1698 n.50. Nonetheless, in many cases, courts “did not
make an explicit finding that the mark in question was famous, or made such a finding
only by confusing fame with distinctiveness.” Id. at 1699 n.51 (citing Lori Krafte-Jacobs,
Comment, Judicial Interpretation of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 66 U.
CIN. L. REV. 659, 690 (1998) (citation omitted)).
64
40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1629 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 116 F.3d 471 (3d Cir. 1997).
65
Id. at 1629–30.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 1630.
68
994 F. Supp. 1454 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
69
Id. at 1454.
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the public in that market.70 Thus, while “Bongo” may have been
distinctive in women’s apparel, it was not inherently distinctive
like “Exxon” or “Kodak.”71 In addition, the mere use of the
“Bongo” mark for 15 years accompanied by extensive third-party
uses of the term “bongo” weighed against a finding of fame.72
2. Distinctiveness
The FTDA mandates that the allegedly diluted mark be
distinctive.73 While fame is a new addition to the realm of
trademark law, distinctiveness is a familiar concept. A trademark
is generally protected in accordance with its distinctiveness.74 To
even achieve a modicum of protection under the law, a merely
descriptive trademark must acquire secondary meaning.75 The
inclusion of a distinctiveness requirement in the FTDA has thereby
puzzled courts and commentators.76
Some commentators, such as Professor McCarthy, suggest that
distinctiveness is simply a synonym for fame and that no separate
finding of distinctiveness is necessary under the FTDA.77 On the
other hand, in Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., the Second Circuit
articulated that the inclusion of the term distinctiveness in the
FTDA was meant to exclude non-distinctive marks from protection
thereunder.78 Although this dispute exists under the FTDA, this
70

Id. at 1463; see also Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 192 F.3d 633,
640–41 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that fame may be restricted to a narrow market if it is the
same market in which the defendant operates).
71
Michael Caruso, 994 F. Supp. at 1463.
72
Id.
73
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).
74
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
75
See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976);
RESTATEMENT, supra note 4.
76
See, e.g., Nguyen, supra note 59, at 209–13.
77
4 MCCARTHY, supra note 26, § 24:91.1, at 24-157–58 (“A trademark cannot be
‘famous’ unless it is ‘distinctive,’ but it can be ‘distinctive’ without being ‘famous.’ In
fact, a designation cannot be a trademark at all unless it is ‘distinctive.’ By definition, all
‘trademarks’ are ‘distinctive’—very few are ‘famous.’”).
78
Nabisco II, 191 F.3d 208, 216 n.2 (2d Cir. 1999) (“We think the inclusion of the
requirement of distinctiveness was intended, for good reason, to deny the protection of
the statute to non-distinctive marks.”). Of course, as Professor McCarthy recognized, this
is unnecessary because distinctiveness is a requirement to first qualify as a trademark. 4
MCCARTHY, supra note 26, § 24.91.1, at 24-156 (“[B]asic trademark principles dictate
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Article will focus on another quarrel over the statutory
interpretation of the FTDA. After satisfying the fame and
distinctiveness quandaries, the plaintiff must then demonstrate that
the defendant’s mark “causes dilution.”79
II. “CAUSES DILUTION” SPLIT
The defendant’s use must cause dilution of the distinctive
quality of the plaintiff’s mark. Notwithstanding the statutory
language, from the enactment of the FTDA until 1999, courts
proceeded with federal dilution claims in the same manner as state
or common law dilution claims. Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve this circuit split.80
A. Pre-Split Standard
Courts initially considered the new FTDA as providing merely
a higher standard of fame or distinctiveness. Rather than viewing
the causation element as determining whether the defendant’s mark
causes dilution of the famous mark, courts instead considered
whether there was a likelihood of dilution of the famous mark.
In Clinique Laboratories, Inc. v. Dep Corp.,81 the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York examined the
causation standard under the FTDA.82 Judge Scheindlin began by
asserting the plaintiff has a lighter burden under the new FTDA
than under prior federal trademark infringement analysis.83 Citing
the legislative history rather than the text of the statute itself, the
court observed that the “language mirrors the traditional New York
dilution analysis, under which dilution can be established by a
showing of either blurring or tarnishment.”84 Judge Scheindlin
that a designation has to be ‘distinctive’ either inherently or through acquisition of
secondary meaning.”).
79
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000).
80
See V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. granted,
122 S. Ct. 1536 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2002) (No. 01-1015).
81
945 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
82
Id. at 561.
83
Id.
84
Id. (referring to H.R. REP. NO. 374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1029, 1030).
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considered the five-factor Mead Data test to assess the dilution by
blurring claim: 1) similarity of the trademarks; 2) similarity of the
products; 3) sophistication of the customers; 4) renown of the
senior mark; and 5) renown of the junior mark.85
B. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc.86
For nearly three years, district courts followed the standard set
forth in Clinique for claims under the FTDA.87 In 1999, the
Second and Fourth Circuits considered the applicability of the
FTDA for the first time. In Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc.,88 the
Second Circuit upheld an injunction preventing the distribution of
Nabisco’s cheese crackers into the marketplace due to the
likelihood of diluting the goldfish cheese cracker trademark of
Pepperidge Farm.89 In this manner, the court interpreted the FTDA
to “permit adjudication granting or denying an injunction, whether
at the instance of the senior user or the junior seeking declaratory
relief, before the [alleged] dilution has actually occurred.”90

85

Id. at 562 (citing Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875
F.2d 1026, 1035 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also supra Part I.A.
86
F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999). Certain factual findings are contained in the district court
opinion, see Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
[hereinafter Nabisco I].
87
See, e.g., Liquid Glass Enters., Inc. v. Dr. Ing, 8 F. Supp. 2d 398, 404 (D.N.J. 1998)
(indicating that plaintiff need only show that the defendant’s use of his trademarks is
likely to cause dilution); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Asiafocus Int’l, Inc., 1998 WL 724000,
at *7 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 1998) (stating the FTDA protects a famous mark from a
likelihood of dilution); Johnson Publ’g Co. v. Willitts Designs Int’l, Inc., 1998 WL
341618, at *7 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 1998) (providing plaintiff must establish that
“defendant’s use of defendant’s mark creates a likelihood of dilution”); Minn. Mining &
Mfg. Co. v. Taylor, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1005 (D. Minn. 1998) (finding defendant’s use
of his marks were likely to dilute plaintiff’s famous mark); Fed. Express Corp. v. Fed.
Espresso, Inc., 1998 WL 690903, at *20 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1998) (utilizing the Mead
Data five-factor test to determine whether dilution by blurring occurred under the
FTDA).
88
191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
89
Id. at 228–29.
90
Id. at 224–25. Contra Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that a plaintiff must
show that a sufficiently similar junior mark must actually lessen the ability of the senior
mark to distinguish its goods).
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Scholars contend that outlandish, specific factual scenarios
generate generally applicable precedent;91 it would, therefore, be
useful to examine the facts of the cheese cracker dispute.
Nabisco,92 in an agreement with Nickelodeon,93 sought to produce
a snack food product based upon the CatDog94 television show.
The ensuing product consisted of miniature orange-colored,
cheese-flavored crackers in the shapes of the two-headed CatDog
character, as well as bones and fish.95 The CatDog-shaped-cracker
represented half of the crackers in a given package, the bone and
the fish each represented one quarter.96 The packaging featured
the CatDog character with bones and fish in the background.97
Pepperidge Farm98 began producing its Goldfish99 line of
crackers in 1962.100 Since its inception, the Goldfish product has

91
See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 3, at 1697 (noting that, particularly in trademark law,
courts “seem to be making . . . law for the extreme case, but . . . then apply[ing] that law
to a large number of run-of-the-mill trademarks”).
92
For the purposes of this Article, the term “Nabisco” includes both (i) Nabisco, Inc., a
New Jersey corporation; and (ii) Nabisco Brands Co., a Delaware corporation. See
Nabisco, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 194. Nabisco products include cookie and cracker foods,
including “Cheese Nips,” the third-best selling brand in the cheese-cracker market. Id.
93
Nickelodeon Television Network, a subsidiary of Viacom International, Inc., airs
television programs aimed at children. Nabisco II, 191 F.3d at 213.
94
CatDog is a cartoon program on the Nickelodeon network. The “star” of the program
is CatDog, “a two-headed creature that is half cat and half dog.” Id. Apparently, CatDog
has a split personality: the cat is “fastidious and emotionally reserved,” while the dog is
“slovenly and boisterous.” Nabisco I, 50 F. Supp. 2d 188, 195–96 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
CatDog garnered a 3.9 Nielsen rating in its first quarter on the air, making it one of the
most-watched children’s programs. Nabisco II, 191 F.3d at 213.
95
Nabisco contended the images of bones and fish represented the duality of the
CatDog character. Nabisco I, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 196. CatDog lived in a house in the shape
of a bone and a goldfish, the character’s respective eating preferences. Nabisco I, 50 F.
Supp. 2d at 196. While the shapes appear in CatDog’s house on the wallpaper and
furniture in Nickelodeon’s marketing video and on the Internet, the district court noted:
Although the CatDog house is built in the shape of a fish and a bone, it appears
on the screen only a few times, for a few seconds. The fish on the wallpaper
and furniture are almost indiscernible. If one were to sneeze while watching
that portion of the video, one would miss the fish shape entirely.
Id. (commenting on the marketing video).
CatDog images are available at
http://www.nick.com/all_nick/tv_supersites/display_show.jhtml?show_id=cat. Id.
96
Nabisco II, 191 F.3d at 213.
97
Id.
98
For the purposes of this Article, the term “Pepperidge Farm” includes both (i)
Pepperidge Farm, Inc., a Connecticut corporation; and (ii) PF Brands, Inc., a Delaware
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become quite successful. In 1998, net sales of Goldfish crackers
reached $200 million.101 The success of recent marketing efforts
has attracted attention from the popular media102 and trade press.103
Pepperidge Farm also owns numerous registered trademarks
related to Goldfish.104 Upon learning of Nabisco’s proposals
related to the launch of the CatDog product, Pepperidge Farm took
appropriate action to protect its Goldfish brand.
U.S. District Court Judge Scheindlin once again utilized the
Mead Data five-factor test to determine whether there was a
likelihood of dilution.105 The judge held that Nabisco’s mark had a
likelihood of diluting Pepperidge Farm’s goldfish mark.106 The
court focused on the distinctiveness of the Pepperidge Farm
goldfish mark, finding Nabisco’s confusingly similar fish-shaped
cheese cracker to be a “signature element” of its product that
“strikes at the heart” of what dilution should prevent:107 “Over

corporation. See Nabisco I, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 194. Pepperidge Farm products include
crackers, snack mixes, pastries, cookies, and other baked goods. Id.
99
For the purposes of this Article, the term “Goldfish” shall refer to the Pepperidge
Farm line of products, including “crackers in various flavors and mixes, the primary
product . . . [being] . . . the orange, cheddar cheese-flavored, fish-shaped cracker, sold in
a bag or box under the trade name ‘Goldfish’ and exhibiting a picture of the cracker on
the exterior.” Nabisco II, 191 F.3d at 212. In terms of sales volume, Goldfish is the
number one selling cheese snack cracker in the United States. Id. at 213.
100
Id. at 212.
101
Id. at 213. The net sales more than doubled in the period from 1995 to 1998. Id.
102
Id. Both the Today Show and the sitcom Friends have prominently featured Goldfish
crackers. Id.
103
The New York Times devoted a full page to the success of the Goldfish brand.
Nabisco I, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 194 n.7 (citing Constance Hays, Will Goldfish Tactics Help
Campbell’s Soups?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1998, at A3).
104
Nabisco I, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 192 n.1. Pepperidge Farm owns trademark registrations
on (i) the name Goldfish for bakery products, U.S. Reg. No. 739,118; (ii) the product
design of the cracker, U.S. Reg. No. 1,640,659; (iii) the product design of a container for
crackers in the shape of a Goldfish, U.S. Reg. No. 1,804,657; (iv) the product design of a
smiling Goldfish for cookies U.S. Reg. No. 1,845,811; (v) the name “Goldfish” for snack
mix U.S. Reg. No. 1,869,834; (vi) the product design of a Goldfish with a smile for
crackers and snack mix U.S. Reg. No. 2,054,823; (vii) and the product design of a
smiling Goldfish with sunglasses for crackers U.S. Reg. No. 2,176,927. Nabisco I, 50 F.
Supp. 2d at 192 n.1. Such registrations become incontestable after five years of use and
compliance with Lanham Act formalities. Id. at 192 n.2.
105
Id. at 205–09; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 4.
106
Id. at 210.
107
Id. at 209.
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time, the presence of Nabisco’s goldfish-shaped cracker within the
CatDog mix is likely to weaken the focus of consumers on the true
source of the Goldfish.”108
While upholding the District Court’s ultimate finding of
dilution, the Second Circuit disagreed with the application of the
Mead Data test to the new federal cause of action set forth in the
FTDA.109 The court, citing several deficiencies with the Mead
Data test,110 commented, “it is by far premature for federal courts
to declare and close the list of factors that will be deemed pertinent
in cases under the new federal act.”111 The Second Circuit also
considered the language of the FTDA in fashioning precisely what
showing was necessary to demonstrate causation.112 The court
acknowledged that the FTDA required causation in the present
tense (“causes dilution”) as opposed to the state law dilution
standard of “likelihood of dilution.”113 Nonetheless, if one reads
the statute to require consummated dilution, one is engaging in
“excessive literalism to defeat the intent of the statute.”114 The
court rejected any contention that the complaining party would
have to demonstrate diminished revenues or produce consumer
surveys to establish dilution.115 Rather, contextual factors, such as

108

Id. at 210.
Nabisco II, 191 F.3d 208, 227–29 (2d Cir. 2001).
110
The test (i) confuses fame and distinctiveness, and (ii) fails to include pertinent
factors such as “actual confusion, likelihood of confusion, shared consumers and
geographic isolation, the adjectival quality of the junior use, and the interrelated factors
of duration of the junior use, harm to the junior user, and delay by the senior [sic] in
bringing the action.” Id. at 228; cf. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elects. Corp., 287 F.2d 492,
495 (2d Cir. 1961) (presenting the oft-cited Polaroid test for trademark infringement: (i)
strength of the senior mark; (ii) similarity of the marks in question; (iii) product
proximity; (iv) quality proximity; (v) likelihood that senior user will bridge the gap and
enter the junior user’s market; (vi) actual confusion; (vii) good faith of the junior user;
(viii) sophistication of the buyers). The Polaroid test is also known as the Sleekcraft or
Frisch test. The factors suggested by the Second Circuit in Nabisco II seem to provide a
senior user with a trademark infringement action with a lower standard of proof. Nabisco
II, 191 F.3d at 228 (applying the FTDA to competitors).
111
Nabisco II, 191 F.3d at 227.
112
Id. at 224.
113
See id.
114
Id.
115
See id. at 223–24.
109
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those used to prove trademark infringement, are sufficient to
establish dilution before any harm actually occurs to the mark.116
By rejecting the Mead Data test used by the district court and
applying “the factors . . . we believe to be pertinent,”117 the Second
Circuit left the FTDA in a state of confusion. The court provided
no framework, but instead rejected a standard used previously in a
body of precedent and interpreted the FTDA in a manner that
frustrated the statutory language.
C. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Utah Division of Travel Development118
In Ringling Bros., the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of
the district court denying Ringling Brothers’ FTDA claim based
upon Utah Division’s use of the mark, “The Greatest Snow on
Earth.”119 In so doing, the court interpreted the FTDA to provide a
“remedy only for actual, consummated dilution and not for the
mere ‘likelihood of dilution’ proscribed by the state statutes.”120
The Fourth Circuit also applied the definition of dilution in the
FTDA, finding that the harm the FTDA intends to remedy is a
mark’s selling power, not its distinctiveness.121 This reading of the
FTDA is diametrically opposed to the Second Circuit’s opinion in
Nabisco.122
Ringling Brothers employed “The Greatest Show on Earth”
mark for over one hundred years, enjoying great success.123 In
1962, the Utah Division of Travel began using “The Greatest Snow
on Earth” to advertise its skiing facilities.124 Ringling Brothers
116

Id. at 224; see also Reichman, supra note 13.
Nabisco II, 191 F.3d at 228.
118
170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999).
119
Id. at 451.
120
Id. at 458.
121
See 25 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000); Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 458.
122
191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999); see supra Part I.B.
123
Ringling Brothers owns full and valid federal registration of its service mark “The
Greatest Show on Earth.” Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp. 605, 609 (E.D. Va. 1997), aff’d, 170 F.3d 449
(4th Cir. 1999). Registration issued on December 5, 1961. Id. In 1996, Ringling
produced over 6.5 billion reproductions of their mark. Id. at 610. In 1997 alone,
concession merchandise featuring the mark exceeded $100 million in sales. Id. at 609.
124
Id. at 611.
117
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challenged the federal registration of the Utah mark.125 Ringling
Brothers commissioned a consumer survey to demonstrate the
dilution of its mark.126 In relevant part, the survey showed that
41% of the respondents in the U.S. associated “The Greatest ___
on Earth” with Ringling alone, while only 25% of the respondents
within Utah so associated the statement.127
U.S. District Court Judge Ellis began by observing that
Ringling Brothers’ mark was famous and that the alleged dilutive
use began after Ringling Brothers’ mark became famous.128 The
judge then considered the causation element in “determining how
this phenomenon can be detected or measured.”129 Judge Ellis
applied the Mead Data test to determine dilution, reasoning that
such application was not inconsistent with the FTDA.130 The court
concluded that the survey evidence, accompanied by a balancing of
the Mead Data factors, did not demonstrate dilution.131

125

See id. at 613.
Id. at 612. RL Associates conducted the survey by interviewing consumers at seven
shopping malls throughout the U.S. Randomly selected shoppers received a card with a
series of fill-in-the-blank statements. The first statement was “I Love ___.” The second
was “Don’t Leave ____ Without It.” The final statement was “The Greatest ___ on
Earth.” If the shopper could correctly identify the final statement, RL Associates
inquired as to with whom or what the shopper associated the completed statement. RL
Associates then inquired further as to whether the shopper associated the statement with
any other source. Id.
127
Id. at 616.
128
See id. at 613.
129
Id.
130
See id. at 613–14.
131
See id. at 616–22. The court found that the survey evidence did not indicate dilution
in Utah. Survey respondents who filled in the blank with “Show” did not associate the
statement with the Utah Division of Travel. Furthermore, 46% of the respondents in
Utah, compared to 41% elsewhere in the country, associated “The Greatest Show on
Earth” with Ringling Brothers. “This is strong evidence of the absence of dilution, not
the presence of it.” Id. at 617.
The court then turned to the “[c]ircumstantial [e]vidence of [d]ilution” as applied
under the Mead Data test. Id. at 618. The court adduced that (i) the marks were not
relevantly similar; (ii) the products were entirely dissimilar; (iii) the corresponding lack
of sophistication of the Ringling Brothers’ consumers with the sophistication of the Utah
Division of Travel consumers was a neutral factor; (iv) there was no predatory intent; (v)
Ringling Brothers’ mark was famous and thereby well-known; and (vi) Utah Division of
Travel’s mark is not very well-known. Id. at 618–22. The resolution of these factors
thereby weighed in favor of Ringling Brothers. Id. at 622.
126
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While upholding the district court’s decision, the Fourth
Circuit refused to apply the Mead Data test.132 The court believed
the extension of the test to the FTDA was “a chancy process at
best.”133 Factors such as “consumer sophistication” and “predatory
intent” may be useful in proving a “likelihood of dilution,” but
provided little utility in determining “actual harm and effective
causation.”134 Dissatisfied with the Mead Data test, the court
turned to the language of the FTDA to determine dilution
causation.135
Recognizing the experience of the “likelihood of dilution”
analysis under state and common law dilution, the court considered
the causation provision of the FTDA.136 The court viewed the
language defining dilution in conjunction with the commercial use
provisions in an economic sense:
However amorphously they may be expressed, and
however difficult to prove in practice, the [FTDA] literally
prescribes as elements of its dilution claim both specific
harm to the senior mark’s economic value in the form of a
“lessening of [its] capacity . . . to identify and distinguish
goods and services,” and a causal connection between that
harm and the “commercial use” of a replicating junior
mark.137
Any other application of the FTDA would produce a property
right in gross for famous marks, comparable to a copyright or
patent but without a specific time limit.138 The Fourth Circuit
insisted that Congress did not intend to create unlimited property
rights in famous trademarks through the use of injunctions for a
mere likelihood of dilution.139
132

Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 451, 453 (4th Cir. 1999).
133
See id. at 464.
134
See id.
135
See id. at 458–62.
136
See id.
137
Id. at 459 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c)(1), 1127 (1995)).
138
See id. at 456.
139
See id. at 459 (“Had that been the intention, it is one easily and simply expressed by
merely proscribing use of any substantially replicating junior mark.”); id. at 461 n.6 (“If
the words convey a definite meaning, which involves no absurdity, nor any contradiction
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The court acknowledged the difficulty of proving dilution
under its interpretation of the FTDA;140 this difficulty may have
led to earlier courts simply applying the “likelihood of dilution”
analysis rather than “facing up to th[is] interpretive difficulty.”141
Despite these problems of proof, the Fourth Circuit refused to
allow courts to ignore the FTDA’s causes dilution requirement,
holding that “actual, consummated dilutive harm” was
necessary.142 The court outlined potential evidentiary sources,
including (i) actual lost revenues accompanied by replicating
junior use to disprove other possible causes; (ii) surveys from
which actual harm and cause may be rationally inferred;143 and (iii)
other “relevant contextual factors.”144
In analyzing whether such proof was present in this case, the
Fourth Circuit upheld the findings of Judge Ellis.145 The court
reiterated that the survey evidence failed to show any actual harm
to the Ringling Brothers’ mark.146 The use of the junior mark did
not lessen the ability of the Ringling Brothers’ mark to identify and
distinguish its service.147 Focusing entirely upon evidence of
consumers’ mental impressions, Ringling Brothers needed to show
actual harm to the selling or advertising power of its mark.148
Mere mental impressions without accompanying economic harm
failed to satisfy this threshold.149 Remaining true to the language
of the FTDA while enunciating a potential framework for
of other parts of the instrument, then that meaning, apparent on the face of the instrument,
must be accepted . . . .” (quoting Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670 (1889))).
140
See id. at 464.
141
Id. (“Courts must of course presume in interpreting statutes creating new civil causes
of action that they have enforceable substantive content. So, within permissible
interpretative bounds, they must seek to find such a meaning rather than ascribe to
Congress the intended or inadvertent doing of a vain legislative deed.”).
142
See id. at 464–65.
143
Id. at 465 (“‘An effective survey . . . must establish not only that consumers associate
the mark with both parties, but also that some quanta of the original mark’s identifying
ability or selling power has been diminished.’” (citing Patrick M. Bible, Defining and
Quantifying Dilution Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Using Survey
Evidence to Show Actual Dilution, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 295, 327–28 (1999))).
144
Id.
145
See id. at 463–64.
146
See id. at 463.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
See id.
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analyzing future cases, the Fourth Circuit prudently interpreted the
new federal statute.
D. Policy Considerations
Subsequent writings on FTDA causation tend to be polarized.
Courts and commentators unabashedly support one circuit over
another, raising various new questions and concerns. Several
courts considering the issue followed the Fourth Circuit’s strict
adherence to the FTDA’s language. In Westchester Media v. PRL
USA Holdings, Inc.,150 the Fifth Circuit followed the rationale of
the Ringling Bros. court.151 The court emphasized the present
tense of the verb “causes” in the FTDA,152 the lack of modification
of the term “dilution,”153 the use of the phrase “another
person’s . . . use” (not merely threatened use)154 and the provision
of damages for willful conduct to strongly indicate that “actual,
consummated dilution, “ rather than mere “likelihood of dilution,”
is required.155 Other district courts deciding to follow the Fourth
Circuit also echoed these observations.156
150

214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 670. For an interesting discussion about the implications of the dilution
dilemma to trade dress, see I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 47–51
(1st Cir. 1998).
152
Westchester, 214 F.3d at 670–71.
153
Id. at 671. The court referenced language from state statutes modifying the term
dilution. Id. at 670 n.16 (citing TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 16.29 (Vernon 2002)
(“A person may . . . enjoin an act likely to . . . dilute the distinctive quality of a
mark . . . .”) (emphasis added); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 360-1 (McKinney 2002)
(“Likelihood of . . . dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark . . . shall be a ground for
injunctive relief . . . .”) (emphasis added).
154
Id. at 669–70 (highlighting one of the most critical differences between the FTDA
and state statutes— the provisions of the state statutes focus upon the prevention of future
harm whereas the FTDA contemplates actual harm).
155
See id.
156
See, e.g., Deborah Heart & Lung Ctr. v. Children of the World Found., 99 F. Supp.
2d 481, 492–93 (D.N.J. 2000) (following the Fourth Circuit’s actual harm standard); Am.
Cyanamid Co. v. Nutraceutical Corp., 54 F. Supp. 2d 379, 391–92 (D.N.J. 1999)
(adopting the Ringling standard); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Comm., Corp., 55 F.
Supp. 2d 1070, 1075 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (applying the Ringling standard and stating
“dilution is ‘not intended to serve as a mere fallback protection for trademark owners
unable to prove trademark infringement’” (quoting I.P. Lund Trading ApS, 163 F.3d at
48)); HQM, Ltd. v. Hatfield, 71 F. Supp. 2d 500, 509 (D. Md. 1999) (obligating a
showing of actual harm); Planet Hollywood (Region IV), Inc. v. Hollywood Casino
151
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Some courts considering the issue viewed the Ringling Bros.
standard as too stringent, its high standard of proof allegedly
preventing recovery in many circumstances. In Times Mirror
Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., the Third
Circuit adopted the “improved” Mead Data test articulated by the
Second Circuit in Nabisco.157 Without expressly addressing the
split, the majority upheld the application of the Nabisco
approach.158 Judge Barry, in a dissenting opinion,159 nonetheless
agreed with such application:
I agree [in siding with the Second Circuit and rejecting the
Fourth Circuit’s position on the issue], and note only that it
would be well-nigh impossible for a widely sold product
such as Kodak to show that its sales have been impacted by
a diluting use of its mark. Indeed, Kodak’s sales might
well be increasing even as the distinctiveness of its truly
famous mark is being whittled away by an unauthorized
user.160

Corp., 80 F. Supp. 2d 815, 899 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (requiring showing of economic harm to
prove dilution).
Due to the opinion of the Third Circuit in Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas
Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2000), the opinions of the U.S. District Court
for the District of New Jersey in both American Cyanamid and Deborah Heart are
presumably overruled. Id. at 179 n.11, (Barry, J., dissenting) (“The majority also holds
that the District Court did not err in finding that irreparable injury may be shown even in
the absence of actual economic harm, presumably siding with the Second Circuit and
rejecting the Fourth Circuit’s position on the issue.”). The Third Circuit filed the Times
Mirror decision on April 28, 2000. Id. at 157. The U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey decided the Deborah Heart case on May 24, 2000. 99 F. Supp. 2d at 481.
Presumably, therefore, Deborah Heart was not “good” law when it was issued.
157
Times Mirror Magazines, 212 F.3d at 169.
158
Id.
159
The purpose of Judge Barry’s dissent is not germane to this Article. Judge Barry
disagreed with the majority in its application of the fame framework under the FTDA. Id.
at 170 (Barry, J., dissenting).
160
Id. at 179 n.11 (Barry, J., dissenting); cf. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined
Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 460 (4th Cir. 1999), providing:
It is not at all improbable that some junior uses will have no effect at all upon a
senior mark’s economic value, whether for lack of exposure, general consumer
disinterest in both marks’ products, or other reasons. Indeed, common sense
suggests that an occasional replicating use might even enhance a senior mark’s
“magnetism”—by drawing renewed attention to it as a mark of unshakable
eminence worthy of emulation by an unthreatening non-competitor. Imitation,
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This view espoused by the dissenting judge (and implicitly by the
Third Circuit) protects the trademark itself, rather than its selling
power or the ability of consumers to identify the famous mark.161
In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc.,162 the Seventh
Circuit followed the “improved” Mead Data test, finding that the
Fourth Circuit’s rule required an insurmountable level of proof163
and left senior mark holders without a remedy.164 Because it
would be necessary to prove actual harm under the Fourth Circuit’s
interpretation, senior mark holders would not be able to bring a
lawsuit prior to an injury.165 At the time the senior mark holders
sustain an injury compensable under the FTDA, a junior mark
holder may have a defense that the senior mark is no longer
distinctive due to the many other uses of the mark.166 Furthermore,
new companies would be unable to determine if their mark was
distinct enough from a famous mark and would require greater and
riskier investments in their advertising.167 The Seventh Circuit
that is, may occasionally operate in the marketplace as in social manners as the
“sincerest form of flattery.”
Id.
161

See generally Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A. Inc., 875 F.2d
1026, 1035 (2d Cir. 1989) (Sweet, J., concurring).
162
233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000).
163
Id. at 468 (“It is hard to believe that Congress would create a right of action but at
the same time render proof of the plaintiff’s case all but impossible.”).
164
See id.
165
See id.
166
See id. at 468–69.
167
See id. at 468. Of course, this ignores the entire federal trademark registration
scheme. See generally Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 46–49 (2d Cir. 1989)
(reviewing the registration process). A company so worried would be able to apply for a
federal registration of its proposed mark and the examiner would bring up concerns over
conflicting marks. Id. It also neglects the availability of state remedies under the
“likelihood of dilution” standard. See supra Part I.A.
In 1999, Congress authorized the Patent and Trademark Office [PTO] to consider the
FTDA when considering the registration of a trademark or the cancellation of a registered
trademark. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(f), 1063, 1064 (2000); Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 25–26, V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir.
2001), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 1536 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2002) (No. 01-1015) [hereinafter
U.S. Brief], available at http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/01-1015/011015.mer.ami.usa.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2002). An opposition may be filed with the
PTO to a trademark registration application when such applicant believes “that he would
be damaged by the registration of a mark . . . as a result of dilution.” Id. at 15 (citing §
1063). Such person may also petition the PTO to cancel the registration of a mark when
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concluded, “Congress could not have intended these unjust and
inefficient results.”168
In V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley,169 the Sixth Circuit
adopted the Nabisco “likelihood of dilution” standard, finding the
Ringling Bros. “actual economic harm” standard contrary to
congressional intent.170 The court acknowledged that the dilution
cause of action essentially involves a “property right in the
‘potency’ of a mark.”171 The Sixth Circuit also construed a
statement in the congressional record to evince that the FTDA
provides a remedy prior to any actual economic harm to the senior
mark.172 A study of the legislative history led the court to
conclude that “it [is] highly unlikely that Congress would have
intended to create such a statute but then make its proof effectively
unavailable.”173 The U.S. Supreme Court granted Moseley’s

she believes “that [s]he is or will be damaged, including as a result of dilution.” Id.
(citing § 1064). The PTO may also refuse the registration of “[a] mark which when used
would cause dilution,” and the PTO may cancel “[a] registration for a mark which when
used would cause dilution.” Id. (citing § 1052(f).
Therefore, while amending the law to permit the PTO to consider future dilution and
making no changes in the “causes dilution” standard, Congress “intended to channel
claims of prospective dilution to [the] PTO, and to limit judicial relief to causes where
some dilution had already occurred.” Id. at 15–16.
168
Eli Lilly, 233 F.3d at 468 (“In the case of an immensely successful product such as
PROZAC, it is possible that the distinctiveness of its mark could be diluted even as its
sales are increasing, albeit not increasing as much as they would in the absence of the
offending mark.”).
169
V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 122
S. Ct. 1536 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2002) (No. 01-1015).
170
Id. at 475–76
171
Id. at 475.
172
See id. at 475–76. The statement provided that dilution is
an injury that differs materially from that arising out of the orthodox confusion.
Even in the absence of confusion, the potency of a mark may be debilitated by
another’s use. That is the essence of dilution. Confusion leads to immediate
injury, while dilution is an infection, which if allowed to spread, will inevitably
destroy the advertising value of the mark.
Id. at 475 (citing H.R. REP. No. 104-374 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,
1032).
173
Id. at 476. It appears remarkable that Congress would adopt statutory language
contrary to the state-law “likelihood of dilution” standard all the while intending to
replicate it. MODEL ACT, supra note 32.
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petition for certiorari to determine whether the FTDA requires
actual consummated harm.174
In its amicus curiae brief, the United States advocated a novel
solution to the circuit split. The Solicitor General contended that
the FTDA does not require actual economic harm nor a likelihood
of dilution, but, simply, present dilution.175 The American Bar
Association argued that using “Buick” for aspirin would diminish
the capacity176 of such a famous mark to distinguish its goods, but
inferring economic harm from this act alone would be
problematic.177 Evidence of economic harm, if available, would be
highly probative but should not be a requirement.178 This
intriguing proposition seems to lay between the speculative
“likelihood of dilution” Nabisco standard and the consummated
“actual economic harm” Ringling Bros. standard.
The approach adopted by the Second Circuit creates a twotiered protection framework for trademark holders. Those marks
that achieve fame can rely on the lax “likelihood of dilution”
analysis for all potentially diluting or infringing marks. Since this
standard is much easier to evaluate than the infringement
analysis,179 judges are more likely to decide a case on dilution than

174

122 S. Ct. 1536 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2002) (No. 01-1015).
U.S. Brief, supra note 167, at 25–26. The Solicitor General contrasted the state law
dilution statutes that allow relief based upon a “likelihood of dilution” with the FTDA’s
language of “causes dilution.” Id. at 6. If Congress intended the former, it could have
used language such as the conditional tense “would cause” or the future tense “will
cause” (or simply adopted the state law language). Id.
176
Cf. Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae at 4–5, 9, 12–13, V
Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct.
1536 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2002) (No. 01-1015), available at http://www.abanet.org/intelprop/
amicubrief.pdf (last visited Aug. 15, 2002) (utilizing Webster’s dictionary to illuminate
the term “capacity” contained within the statutory definition of “dilution” in 15 U.S.C. §
1127 (2000) to eventually arrive at the contention that the FTDA textually supports the
“likelihood of dilution analysis”). The ABA further contended that the Solicitor General
“focuses unduly on the [statutory] phrase ‘causes dilution’ and pays insufficient attention
to the definition of dilution.” Id. at 6 n.11 (citing U.S. Brief, supra note 167, at 25–26 at
6–7, 13–14, 26–27).
177
U.S. Brief, supra note 167, at 25 (“[T]he text of the FTDA only requires proof that a
junior use causes a lessening in the capacity of the famous mark to distinguish goods and
services.”).
178
Id. at 26.
179
See Reichman, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
175
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face a more difficult infringement analysis.180 The non-famous
marks, on the other hand, would have to rely upon the more
difficult infringement analysis and state or common law dilution, if
available.
Commentators are split over the implications of the Nabisco
court’s broad reading. Some commentators purposefully advocate
a property right for the holders of famous trademarks.181 Other
commentators view the property right as a dangerous expansion of
trademark rights to the detriment of competition.182
III. THE DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM
While the application of the Nabisco standard alarms some
commentators and courts when applied to run-of-the-mill
trademarks, it is especially alarming when applied to domain
names. The special features of domain names preclude the
potential for differentiation among other domain names, unlike that
of trademarks affixed to goods that may differ in color, size, smell,
placement on product, etc. Today (if not by the mid-1990s), no
major corporation can deny the importance of an Internet site.183
Businesses with a brand name product typically seek to employ the
website “http://www.brandname.com.”184 The unavailability of
the brand name domain led many corporations to turn to trademark
180

See U.S. Brief, supra note 167 at 25.
See, e.g., Maya Alexandri, The International News Quasi-Property Paradigm and
Trademark Incontestability: A Call for Rewriting the Lanham Act, 13 HARV. J.L. &
TECH, 303, 343–44 (2000) (acknowledging the movement in trademark law towards
recognizing trademarks as property and outlining the argument for granting such rights).
182
Marroletti, supra note 16, at 688–90 (“Because an injunction based on the likelihood
of trademark dilution protects against an injury that is speculative and therefore
immeasurable, the potential cost of this protection outweighs the benefit to plaintiffs.”).
The author agrees.
183
See Developments in the Law: The Law of Cyberspace, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1574,
1578 (1999) (mentioning that there were 200 million Internet users by the end of 1998
and speculating that Internet commerce is likely to reach nearly $300 billion of the U.S.
GDP by 2002).
184
Yochai Benkler, How (if at all) to Regulate the Internet: Net Regulation: Taking
Stock and Looking Forward, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1203, 1256–57 (2000) (Consumers,
“rather than going to a search engine, shopping software, or review site, hunt around for
http://www.brandname.com,
or
http://www.brand-name.com,
or
http://www.brandname.net.”).
181
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law “as a means of stripping domain names from their holders—
even where those holders are not infringing any trademarks.”185
Whereas a trademark can consist of “[a]ny word, name, symbol
or device, or any combination thereof,”186 a domain name can only
consist of “combinations of letters, numbers, and some typographic
symbols”187 up to 63 characters in total length.188 The resultant
query is “how different Internet governance should be in order to
accommodate the Internet’s novel circumstances and adapt to
explosive growth in users, commerce, and political
stakeholders.”189 While courts initially struggled with trademark
law to encompass disputes over Internet domain names,190
Congress passed new legislation to partially address the novel
challenges presented by the new technology.
Two challenges presented themselves to the courts in resolving
domain name disputes. The first scenario involved a legitimate
dispute between entities with similar product or trade names,
wherein existing trademark law served as a useful mechanism.
The other scenario involved persons who traffic in domain names,
at the expense of trademark holders.191 In 1999, Congress passed

185

Carl Oppedahl, Half a Century of Federal Trademark Protection: The Lanham Act
Turns Fifty: Analysis and Suggestions Regarding NSI Domain Name Trademark Dispute
Policy, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 73, 75–76 (1996).
186
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
187
Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 492 (2d Cir. 2000).
See also id. at 492 n.2 (“Certain symbols, such as apostrophes (‘), cannot be used in a
domain name.” ).
188
DNS: The Domain Name System, supra note 24.
189
Developments in the Law: The Law of Cyberspace, supra note 183, at 1657.
190
While entities exist providing arbitration for certain domain name disputes (e.g.,
ICANN, NSI), all such organizations honor a valid judgment from a court. Kevin Eng,
Breaking Through the Looking Glass: An Analysis of Trademark Rights in Domain
Names Across Top Level Domains, 6 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 7, 9 (2000). Consideration
of the history, development, and procedure governing such disputes is outside the scope
of this Article. For information regarding such issues, see Stuart D. Levi et al., The
Domain Name System & Trademarks, in THIRD ANNUAL INTERNET LAW INSTITUTE, 453–
63 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No.
G0-0051, 1999).
191
Sporty’s Farm, 202 F.3d at 495 (“[M]any cybersquatters are now careful to no longer
offer the domain name for sale in any manner that could implicate liability under existing
trademark dilution case law.”).
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the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA)192 to
address the latter. Existing trademark law, especially that of
trademark dilution, remained to address the former.
A. Federal Cybersquatting Legislation
Congress enacted the ACPA to stop cybersquatters193 “who
register numerous domain names containing American
trademarks . . . only to hold them ransom in exchange for
money.”194 Under the ACPA, a plaintiff must first demonstrate
that the mark is distinctive or famous.195 The plaintiff must then
demonstrate the domain name in question is “identical or
confusingly similar to” the plaintiff’s mark.196 A court then
considers a number of factors to determine if the defendant had a
“bad faith intent to profit” from the domain name registration.197
A court may enjoin the use of the domain name198 and award
damages to a successful plaintiff.199

192

Pub. L. No. 106-113, §§ 3001–3010, 113 Stat. 1537, 537–43 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
1125(d)).
193
Cybersquatting “involves the registration as domain names of well-known
trademarks by non-trademark holders who then try to sell the names back to the
trademark owners.” Morrison & Foerster LLP v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1127 (D.
Colo. 2000) (quoting Sporty’s, 202 F.3d at 493).
194
H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 5 (1999).
195
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I), (I)(B), (II) (2000); see also Sporty’s Farm, 202
F.3d at 497.
196
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I); see also Sporty’s Farm, 202 F.3d at 497–98.
197
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i); see also Sporty’s Farm, 202 F.3d at 498. The ACPA
lists the nine factors at 15 § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I)–(IX). The ACPA also provides a safe
harbor: if the defendant “believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that the use of
the domain name was fair use or otherwise lawful.” Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii). See also
Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 270 (4th Cir. 2001).
198
The ACPA permits a court to order the defendant to forfeit, cancel or transfer the
domain name to the plaintiff. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(C); see also Sporty’s Farm, 202
F.3d at 500. The entity in charge of the particular domain name registration must honor a
valid judgment from a court. See Developments in the Law: The Law of Cyberspace,
supra note 183.
199
The Second Circuit stated “[a]lthough the [ACPA] uses the term ‘liable,’ it does not
follow that damages will be assessed.” Sporty’s Farm, 202 F.3d at 499–500 n.14. At any
rate, damages are not available for activity contemplated under the ACPA prior to
November 17, 1999 (the date of the passage of the ACPA). Id.
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In Morrison & Foerster LLP v. Wick,200 the U.S. District Court
for the District of Colorado applied the ACPA to a defendant that
registered domain names similar to that of the plaintiff’s
trademark.201 Defendant registered “http://www.morrisonfoerster.
com,” “http://www.morrisonandfoerster.com” and other common
misspellings of the plaintiff’s law firm.202 The court granted
summary judgment for the plaintiff, indicating the defendant had
no intellectual property rights in the domain names,203 the domain
names were confusingly similar to the plaintiff’s mark204 and the
defendant had the requisite bad faith under the ACPA.205 Thus, the
court ordered the defendant to forfeit his interests in the domain
names, to permanently avoid hindering the law firm’s ability to
obtain subject domain names and awarded plaintiff its costs.206
Cases decided under the ACPA are less complex than those
ultimately decided under the FTDA because of the bad faith
element.207 When bad faith is not present and a dispute arises over
two potentially legitimate uses of the same domain name, that
challenges the reach of the FTDA.

200

94 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (D. Colo. 2000).
Id. at 1126.
202
Id. at 1127. Defendant also registered “http://www.morrisonforester.com” and
“http://www.morrisonandforester.com.” Id. Defendant also registered other law firm
names as domain names, as well as various offensive terms that he linked to the sites he
registered in a similar manner as the Morrison & Foerster LLP trademark. Id. at 1128.
203
Id. at 1131. Interestingly, defendant registered to do business in Colorado under the
name “Morri, Son & Foerster” several months after he acquired the domain names in
question. Id. The court mentioned this was indicative of the defendant’s bad faith since
he did not offer any bona fide services or goods in connection with these domain names.
Id.
204
Id. at 1130 (“Because ampersands cannot be used in Internet domain names, two
of . . . [the defendant’s] domain names are, in all practical aspects, identical to [the
plaintiff’s mark].”); see also Brookfield Comms., Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174
F.3d 1036, 1055 (9th Cir. 1999) (indicating the differences between the mark
“MovieBuff” and the “moviebuff.com” domain name are “inconsequential in light of the
fact that Web addresses are not caps-sensitive”).
205
Morrison & Foerster, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 1130–32.
206
Id. at 1136.
207
See Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir.
2001) (stating that the case would be much closer over the domain name
“http://www.vw.net” if not for the direct evidence establishing bad faith).
201

264

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13:231

B. Domain Name Dilution
Application of a liberal standard in determining what exactly
“causes dilution” most clearly exemplifies the concerns of many
commentators regarding the creation of the property right in gross.
The limited means available to distinguish characters on a domain
name make disputes under the FTDA difficult. It is inconsistent to
allow competition to foster in real space while simultaneously
enjoining it in cyberspace.
For instance, Time Warner Cable operates a high-speed
Internet service entitled “Roadrunner.”208
Warner Brothers
employs the trademark “Road Runner” for a popular cartoon
character and conducts sales of merchandise, television
programming, etc., under its mark.209 While no infringement and
dilution dispute existed in real space, Time Warner’s registration
and use of the domain name “http://www.roadrunner.com” brought
forth such a dispute.210 Although the court dismissed the action
because Time Warner failed to demonstrate the requisite harm,211
the adoption and expansion of the Nabisco court’s causation
framework would potentially grant the Warner Brothers of the
world a monopoly, to the detriment of legitimate users like Time
Warner.
In Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Feinberg,212 the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York considered the claim that the
domain name “http://www.gunsareus.com” diluted the “Toys ‘R’
Us” mark under the FTDA.213 Acknowledging the rights of the
plaintiff to the family of marks ending in the phrase “‘R’ Us,” the
court contemplated the safety provided by two characters (“a_e”)

208

Peter Brown, New Issues in Internet Litigation, in 17TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
COMPUTER LAW: THE EVOLVING LAW OF THE INTERNET—COMMERCE, FREE SPEECH,
SECURITY, OBSENITY AND ENTERTAINMENT, at 169–71 (PLI Pats., Copyrights,
Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. G4-3987, 1997).
209
Id.
210
Id.
211
Id. (citing Roadrunner Computer Sys., Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., Civil Docket
No. 96-413-A (E.D. Va. June 21, 1996)). Note that the Eastern District of Virginia falls
under the appellate jurisdiction of the Fourth Circuit.
212
26 F. Supp. 2d 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), vacated by 201 F.3d 432 (2d Cir. 1999).
213
Id. at 640.
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to the defendant.214 Judge Schwartz granted the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment, observing:
Defendants neither make use of the single letter ‘R’ nor do
they space or color the letters and words in a manner
remotely related to plaintiffs. The name “gunsareus”
appears in all lower case letters with no spaces in between
the letters. The Court finds that the use of such an
[I]nternet domain name, without naming the website itself
‘Guns ‘R’ Us’’ or ‘Guns Are Us,’ will not, as a matter of
law, blur [or tarnish] the distinctiveness of plaintiffs’ ‘R’
Us family of marks.215
The Second Circuit overruled the opinion of Judge Schwartz,
requiring the judge to apply the law as stated in Nabisco, decided
in the interim.216
Other courts have also made similarly tough decisions under
similar circumstances.217 Due to the potential good faith argument
on both sides of these issues,218 the action of trademark
infringement219 (and/or the dilution standard of the Fourth
Circuit)220 would resolve such disputes in a prudent manner. The
good faith disputes over trademarks in Internet domain names
should, ergo, return to the original purposes of trademark
214

Id. at 643.
Id. at 644.
216
Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Feinberg, 201 F.3d 432 (2d Cir. 1999). Judge Schwartz, for the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, decided Toys “R” Us, 26 F.
Supp. 2d at 639, on October 28, 1998. The Second Circuit decided Nabisco II, 191 F.3d
208, 208 (2d Cir. 1999), nearly a year later on August 31, 1999.
217
See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1999)
(finding triable issue of fact in dispute over the same phrases followed by the top-level
domain “.com” for the plaintiff and “.net” for the defendant); Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky,
993 F. Supp. 282, 291, 306–08 (D.N.J. 1998) (deciding for plaintiff on dilution analysis
over the domain names “http://www.jewsforjesus.org” and “http://www.jews-forjesus.com” even though plaintiff only had the right to use the trademark “Jews f_r Jesus,”
the “_” accounting for a depiction of the star of David); Cardservice Int’l, Inc. v. McGee,
950 F. Supp. 737, 738–40 (E.D. Va. 1997), aff’d, 129 F.3d 1258 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding
defendant liable under infringement analysis for using the domain name
“http://www.cardservice.com” for his company “EMS—Card Service on the Caprock” to
the detriment of the plaintiff corporation “Cardservice International”).
218
Courts should handle cases with bad faith under the ACPA. See supra Part IV.A.
219
See Reichman, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
220
Supra Part II.C.
215
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protection, preventing confusion as to the source of origin or
ownership.221
CONCLUSION
Trademark protection allows the public to easily identify the
source of a particular product.222 While courts expand the dilution
concept further and further, trademark rights become more of a
property right in gross than a source identifier.223 Dilution law, at
first envisioned as a means to protect famous marks against uses
on non-competing products,224 has now become a backup plan in
case a trademark infringement claim is unsuccessful.225 This
concept now applies to non-competing, non-identical marks that
have a speculative possibility of diluting a famous mark. This
“merely masks the circular reasoning in thinking that the
distinctive quality of a mark will be diluted by unauthorized use;
all that has been proven is that a mark will be diluted if it is
diluted.”226
Although alarming when applied to tangible products and
services, the liberal application endorsed by the Second Circuit
becomes even more concerning when applied to Internet domain
names. The expansive doctrine, derived from the intricacies in the
shapes of cheese crackers, truly echoes Professor Lemley’s
prognostication, “we . . . seem to be making trademark law for the
extreme case, but we then apply that law to a large number of runof-the-mill trademarks.”227 With the limited ability to differentiate
a finite universe of typewritten characters with a finite length,
Internet domain names can only be so unique. Rather than protect
some notional whittling away of distinctiveness, trademark law as
221

Supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
Lemley, supra note 3, at 1688.
223
Id. at 1699. A trademark in gross is “unconnected to a particular product—to a wide
variety of owners.” Id.
224
Schechter, supra note 5, at 825 (“It is the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the
identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by its use upon noncompeting goods.”) (emphasis added).
225
Kirkpatrick & Klein, supra note 52, at 57.
226
Moskin, supra note 1, at 132.
227
Lemley, supra note 3, at 1697.
222
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applied to Internet domain names should be constructed around the
single question: Is the public confused as to the origin or
ownership of the domain name?
The best means to this end is to suspend application of
trademark dilution to Internet domain names or apply the Fourth
Circuit’s dilution causation framework. Actual, demonstrable
harm rather than a likelihood of dilution rewards competition,
protects the public from being misled, and allows for even-handed
application by a court. Therefore, Congress should amend the
FTDA or the Supreme Court should interpret the Act accordingly.

